# Looking into the future of business — the decade after COVID-19

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The decade after COVID19...




# 2020, the year the earth stood still- enhance the prior macro-social long-term trends



- De-globalization, Localization, Automations, Social instability, Populist policies,
   Economic nationalism protectionism, Limit of monetary policy, Surveillance
- Covid-19's influence will extend beyond the current lockdown peak. We expect this
  pandemic to accelerate many macro trends that would have taken five or more years
  to play out before, from peak globalization, to renewed tech wars and a reappraisal of
  healthcare systems and gov't influence. Consumer behavior change will also accelerate

#### 5 themes and best/worst placed after great isolation




Source: BofA Global Research

### 1. Geopolitics & Globalization: enter the dragon, cometh the eagle



- The most significant legacy of Covid-19 could be a reshaping of world order in manufacturing, sourcing, trade, tariffs, sanctions and tech, driven by geopolitics. Along with ESG, it is likely to drive much faster shift in manufacturing away from China
- Beneficiaries: Automation, Industrial Software, Cleantech;
- Challenged: Shipping, Materials, Fast Fashion, Fossil Energy

### The past 2,000 years of economic history; share of GDP by country over time










- Our survey tells us that 80% of our BofA analysts see geopolitics/tariffs as the key deglobalization driver (pandemics 53%, technology 24%).
- Over a third of analysts have seen or are expecting reshoring or diversification in supply chains while half of analysts expect climate-friendly investments to increase post Covid-19

What will be the key driver(s) for decline in globalization?\*

Has the Covid-19 pandemic affected plans for re-shoring supply chains for companies in your coverage group?







response

### 2. Tech Wars: The race for supremacy to spark a new wave of investments




- Race for tech supremacy could pull forward commercialization of Moonshot technologies such as autonomous vehicles, quantum computing, and vertical farming.
   Nearer-term, trends like WFH, eCommerce, and stay-at-home activities (e.g. streaming and eSports) could see increasing long-term adoption.
- Beneficiaries: Cloud, 5G, Processing Power, Robotics; Autonomous Vehicles.
   Challenged: Privacy, Old Media, Bricks & Mortar, Sharing Economy.

### China overtaken US in R&D spending

Total R&D investment, \$bn \$916bn Today, China is investing 900 \$501bn in R&D, surpassing JS China the US (\$493bn) for the 1st 800 time in history. 700 600 500 400 Based on the last decade's 300 trends, the China-US R&D gap will grow to \$304bn by 2025. 200 100 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

### Quantum Computing patent filings by country. China 2x US, 13x Europe...



Source: Patinformatics


### Tech remains a spending priority for almost all




• Our survey tells us that half of sector analysts expect technology investments in their sectors to increase, with 44% expecting more robots & automation.

### Are your companies planning to increase capex spending on tech?

Has the Covid-19 pandemic affected plans for deploying robotics or automated processes for companies in your coverage group?





Source: BofA Global Research Source: BofA Global Research

### 3. Big Government: a new social contract




- Covid-19 has handed governments a new social mandate to protect their citizens. Governments will exert greater influence on businesses with shareholder supremacy potentially eroding in favour of stakeholders. Tech is also more useful for gov't power.
- Beneficiaries: Stakeholders, Tech, Safety, ESG; Challenged: Privacy, Debt, Shareholders

Over 30 countries have openly implemented tracking techniques on their citizens

Surging stimulus - Governments worldwide pledge more than \$8 trillion in fiscal support








### **Big Government: Safety over privacy**




 Our survey tells us that 33% of BofA analysts expect shareholder rights to be eroded either through government intervention or changing priorities within companies beyond temporary erosion from companies taking government aid.

#### Are shareholder rights/voice being eroded?

In the next 2-5 years, how do you expect the current crisis to impact capital structure?\*






### 4. Health: the new wealth and focus for ESG




- However, Covid-19 will amplify the importance of healthcare and its social role and accelerate other pressing global public health issues such as drug pricing, antibiotics resistance, future pandemics prevention, universal vaccines for all, etc.
- Beneficiaries: Social in ESG, HealthTech; Challenged: Traditional Healthcare Model,
   Data Privacy.

Public expenditure as % of total healthcare expenditure

Life expectancy vs. health expenditure, 1970 to 2015





Source: World Bank + WDI, Our World in Data

Source: Our World in Data


### 5. The Classes, Polarization, New Consumer: "OK, Zoomer"




- Gen Z may be uniquely prepared for the new era of interactions following Covid-19 –
  other generations will need quickly to learn and change their consumer habits.
  Further, this global pandemic could result in a slowdown or reversal of the decadeslong march to pull billions out of poverty
- Beneficiaries: Gen Z, New Media, Payments, ESG;
- Challenged: Millennials, Baby boomers, Bottom Billions, Traditional Consumer

Number of concurrent viewer for Amazon's Twitch gaming platform doubles in 4 months

Number of people below the US\$5.50/day poverty line given 5%, 10%, 20% cut to economy (millions)





**Tectonic shifts in global supply chains** 

Started even before the outbreak of COVID-19




### Mapping shifts in global supply chains



- The past three decades have witnessed a dramatic expansion in international trade and the globalization of supply chains
- However, starting as early as 2008, globalization has first paused and is now starting to reverse on persistent factors such as automation, national security, nationalism, tariffs, etc.

### The evolution of globalization



Source: World Economic Forum




### Supply chains are moving...

- According to a survey of BofA analysts, firms in 83% of global sectors in N. America and in Asia Pac (ex. China) have either implemented or discussed plans to shift portions of their supply chains from current locations, while 90% of sectors in EU are doing so
- N. American firms are ahead in moving out of China, on tariff and security concerns

### **Supply Chain Shifts from their Current Locations –.**

### N. American ahead of Asia (ex-China) & EU in moving supply chains out of China





Source: BofA Global Research Source: BofA Global Research




### ...out of China...

- Chinese labor costs (in USD terms per worker) were comparable to the rest of Asia in 2001, but are now a multiple of those in other large Asian countries
- Even when adjusted for productivity, labor costs in China are well above other Emerging Asia markets (even Singapore). So, the imposition of punitive tariffs only exacerbated the exodus, not triggered it.

### Average monthly nominal wages in USD

#### 4,000 900 800 3,500 Singapore (RHS) 700 3,000 China Malaysia 600 2,500 500 2,000 Thailand 400 1,500 300 **Philippines** 1,000 200 India 500 100 Indonesia 2007 2008 2009 India Viet Nam Malaysia **Philippines** Singapore (RHS) Source: II O

### Avg monthly wages (USD), adjusted for output per worker



Source: ILO



### ...and bound homeward and closer to the consumer

- According to BofA analysts survey, half of sectors for N. America plan to relocate supply chains back home, if not already. S.E. Asia is also popular choice. In EU, only 2 of 12 sectors are homebound, but eight plan to move to their epicenters of consumption.
- Similarly, in the Asia (excluding China), barring Healthcare, F&B, retail, all sectors have or plan to move their supply chains back home or their consumption centers. About 60% prefer S.E. Asia as their destination for relocation, followed by India (33%).

### Companies are inclined to move their supply chains to Asia South and North America







- S.E. Asia is greatest destination given lower labor costs. Vietnam will benefit most on export composition overlap with China (thus having solid capacity, tech and ecosystem) on top of low labor costs
- Despite low labor costs, India/Indonesia are unlikely to benefit significantly, on no meaningful export merchandise to US. These countries would need to create supply chains/logistics from scratch, to benefit from relocation from China.

### Companies Country comparative analysis – emerging countries score well on labor while developed countries have existing manufacturing and export base

Country	Avg. daily wages (\$)	Regulatory Quality	Logistics Performance Index	Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)	Goods exports (% of GDP)	Country credit rating	
Bangladesh	1	12	11	8	10	11	
China	10	8	3	1	8	3	
Indonesia	3	7	8	5	9	9	
India	4	9	7	11	11	7	
Korea, Rep.	11	2	2	2	5	2	
Mexico	8	4	9	9	6	4	
Malaysia	9	3	6	4	3	5	
Pakistan	2	11	12	12	12	12	
Philippines	6	6	10	6	7	8	
Singapore	12	1	1	7	1	1	
Thailand	7	5	4	3	4	6	
Vietnam	5	10	5	10	2	10	





- Manufacturing is moving back to North America after a hiatus of three decades, as evident from the number of job vacancies in the US.
- About 400,000 US factory jobs are unfilled close to highest level in nearly two
  decades as companies compete for skilled labor in the midst of record-low
  unemployment.

### About 400,000 US factory jobs are unfilled – close to the highest level in nearly two decades



Source: BofA Global Research, Bloomberg

### Manufacturing industries have the highest multiplier effects on the economy




- Analysis suggests a dollar spent on a manufacturing facility generates the highest economic activity and employment multiplier among all sectors.
- Every dollar in final sales of manufactured products supports USD1.33 in output from other sectors, while six indirect jobs are created for every new job in manufacturing

### **Every dollar in final sales of manufactured products** supports USD1.33 in output from other sectors

### Manufacturing Agriculture, forestry & hunting Transportation and warehousing Construction Arts, entertainment & food Information Educational & health care Retail trade Other services, except govt. Professional and business services 0.8 1.2 ■ Economic activity generated by \$1 of Sector GDP

### Indirect employment generated by different sectors



Source: Economic Policy Institute


## Manufacturing industries drive innovation through R&D and industrial clusters




- Domestic R&D spend-to-sales (%) is much higher for manufacturing (5.5%) than non-manufacturing (3.6%), leading to much higher intensity of product/service launches.
- Further, establishment of a manufacturing facility generally leads to the development of an industrial cluster which has benefits of high productivity and innovation.

### Only 15% of non-manufacturing firms introduced new product or service in 2014-16 vs 33% for manufacturing

## Domestic R&D as a % of domestic net sales is higher for manufacturing vs non-manufacturing





■ US domestic R&D as a % of domestic sales (2016)


Source: National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics





- US manufacturing workers typically see a significant wage premium over peers in the non-manufacturing sectors.
- The wage and compensation premium for a manufacturing worker in the US ranges from 3% to as high as 19% relative to a comparable nonmanufacturing workers.

Manufacturing premium (how much more a manufacturing worker in the US makes per hour than a comparable nonmanufacturing worker in the private sector)




# Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage: Works well under the globalization



- By our estimates, globalization has contributed to net margin expansion of about 2.2ppt through lower cost of goods sold and lower taxes in 2004-17. A reversal of these benefits will be costly.
- The costs are particularly high during the transition to the new supply chain when old capital is "stranded" in the wrong place and hence is no longer productive.

### Globalization has been a big contributor to S&P 500 net margin expansion since 2004




Source: FactSet, BofA US Equity & Quant Strategy

### **Automation is almost automatic**



- According to a survey of BofA analysts, the unanimous (almost) weapon to combat rising costs seems to be automation in North America and Asia Pac (excluding China)
- However, in Europe, much less automation and regulatory / tax benefits are expected


### Mechanisms to offset higher costs associated with relocation for each region



### Automation and Robotics: Validating the case for reshoring



## Industrial robot prices – expect to keep falling



- We believe the global installed base can hit 5mn units by 2025, doubling 2019 levels, as they become more affordable, and more flexible and autonomous by virtue of artificial intelligence. This will accelerate and validate the case for reshoring.
- The Boston Consulting Group estimates 1% reduction in robot prices and 5% improvement in productivity annually over the next decade.

Source: BoJ, BofA Global Research, BCG. Price indexed to 100 in 2011

Life in China after COVID-19

The long term implications






### Americans have less favorable view of China

 We are seeing growing percentage of the population in the US becoming unfavorable towards China post-COVID-19, as 66% of US adults had an unfavorable opinion of China in a recent survey (up from 60%)

### % of US adults who say they have favorable/unfavorable opinion of China




Source: Pew research center






- COVID-19 could lead to reduced trust and goodwill between China and the US. Although
  we expect Phase 1 trade deals to hold, risks may grow as the US election nears.
- In the long run, we expect heightened geopolitical tensions and rising market risk premium, as China seeks to raise its global influence

#### **Trend of China-US trade**



### China's trade surplus with the US, US\$bn




Source: Wind Source: Wind






- Post-COVID-19, people in China could be more willing to forgo privacy and to bear government's close surveillance for personal safety. This should benefit related sectors including surveillance equipment, face recognition software, AI, cloud, big data, etc
- We expect SOEs' position to strengthen in areas of strategic importance to the gov't, since SOEs helped cushion the negative shock to the economy from the pandemic.

China: fiscal spending on public security, as a % of total



Rate of work resumption as of Feb 20: SOEs vs. private



Source: Wind


Source: China Enterprise Confederation

Note: For top 500 manufacturers

### Digital infrastructure & a technology race



## China's high-tech export as a % of total export



Source: CEIC

- The outbreak has made the Chinese government more determined to develop the country's technology sector, especially in digital technology, which is at the forefront of the technology curve
- The disruption caused by the virus in many countries may also give Chinese players an opening to advance their market share

### • <u>Digital Infrastructure</u>


- 1. Regulatory framework IP protection, privacy, data security, data sharing
- 2. Foundational frameworks semi, 5G, Al, Big data, quantum computing, cloud
- Network content layer fiber optic, RF, software

### Offline – online migration




- The pandemic has clearly demonstrated the advantage of ecommerce vs. offline retailing. As a result, we expect online sales to continue to gain market share.
- Given importance of delivery in e-commerce, e-commerce and logistics companies may develop low-human-touch delivery, e.g., robots, drones, self-driven vehicles
- Ecommerce, remote working, online education, e-doctors, online entertainments

#### **Ecommerce market share, China vs. the US**



#### **Automation market size – China**



Source: Euro monitor

Source: Gongkong, CCID

### Leaving China is not easy / Rome was not built in a day!




- China offered optimal mix of costs, quality, efficiency, manpower and infrastructure for 30 years leading it to account for 25%+ of world's manufacturing value added.
- One Chinese worker can manufacture about the same value of goods as four from ASEAN. Also, the lead time to hit the shelves in US stores can take up to 40 days from Thailand, almost twice as long as from China.

## Manufacturing – a 30-year shift from the US and Europe to China, are we at a pivotal point today?

#### Manufacturing value added as % of world 50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% US Europe China 0% 1/70 1/75 1/80 1/85 1/90 1/95 1/00 1/05 1/10

## Labor productivity - one Chinese worker can manufacture about the same value of goods as four from ASEAN



Source: United Nations Population Database, World Bank

Source: United Nations

Are we ready to face new reality?




### 75% of jobs at risk from automation



- We estimate about 75% of jobs in EM are highly susceptible to replacement by robots, an even greater share than in DM. This is because many EM have a much higher share of manufacturing in GDP than DM, as high as 30% in Korea, Mexico and Poland.
- China substitutes = ASEAN, CEE/Turkey, Korea, Mexico

### 75% of jobs in EM are at risk of replacement by automation – most in Mexico, least in Russia




### An ever harder quest for growth / EM has been the main growth drivers




- Asian economies (Korea, SGP, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam), the CEE countries, Turkey
  and Mexico are closest <u>substitutes to China</u> in the global value chains.
- In a world short of growth, inundated by debt and likely full of political conflict, we
  would favor countries with competitive growth models, reasonably stable politics and
  sustainable fiscal. Countries with strained balance sheets will be even more at risk.

### CEE, Mexico, Turkey & some Asian countries are close China substitutes in the GVC



### EM have been main drivers of global growth



Note: The positioning index is calculated as a ratio of forward to backward participation in the OECD's Global Value Chain (GVC) database which allows comparing domestic vs. foreign value added as a percentage of total exports. Downstream countries' exports have a high import content while Upstream countries are either commodity exporters or strong in R&D. Source: OECD. WTO. BofA Global Research

Note: Real GDP (%yoy) contributions. Source: Haver, BofA Global Research

### Balance sheets near a breaking point



- The fiscal costs of Covid-19 and even lower growth will add to the strain on sovereign and corporate balance sheets globally, including in many emerging markets
- Among the bigger markets, Brazil (fiscal), South Africa (fiscal) and Turkey (FX liquidity) stand out as most vulnerable, while Korea seems to relatively stable.

Pressure points in red could push countries into financial or debt crises: comparison vs last EM crash in 2015


Country	current acc	current account % GDP		FX reserves/short-term		foreign currency debt		local currency external		net international investment		bank capital to risk	
			ex temal debt		% GDP (al	% GDP (all sectors)		debt % GDP (all sectors)		position, % of GDP		weighted assets	
	2020	2015	latest	2015	latest	2015	latest	2015	latest	2015	latest	2015	
Argentina	0.1	-2.7	65.7	43.1	58.4	25.6	3.7	0.9	25.0	8.8	17.5	13.3	
Brazil	-3.9	-3.0	490.3	692.6	28.2	28.2	8.2	8.8	-38.9	-20.8	17.7	16.4	
China	0.9	2.8	259.4	406.8	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	15.5	14.9	14.5	13.5	
India	-0.7	-1.0	405.6	409.9	12.5	16.2	6.5	6.5	-15.2	-17.3	15.2	12.7	
Indonesia	-2.7	-2.0	272.1	268.7	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	-29.9	-43.8	23.3	21.3	
Korea	5.4	7.2	270.4	348.1	20.5	19.9	7.8	7.2	31.2	13.9	15.2	13.9	
Mexico	-0.9	-2.7	312.2	246.9	27.0	25.1	8.3	10.5	-50.2	-51.3	16.0	15.0	
Poland	1.0	-0.6	215.4	248.3	38.4	44.9	22.0	24.5	-50.2	-60.0	18.4	16.0	
Russia	0.9	5.0	936.5	761.7	20.7	32.1	8.2	6.1	23.3	25.0	12.5	12.7	
Saudi Arabia	-6.2	-8.7	1140.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	86.1	105.4	19.4	18.1	
South Africa	-2.0	<del>-4</del> .6	143.1	143.1	26.0	21.8	23.6	17.3	13.1	12.9	16.8	14.2	
Turkey	-1.6	-3.2	66.6	88.4	55.2	43.8	3.2	2.8	-46.9	-44.7	18.4	15.6	

# Better to be young and healthy, check for fiscal space; domestic growth; political stability




- Aged countries already have lower growth, but Covid-19 is likely to reinforce this relationship 1) as consumers there will be more cautious of infection 2) a greater need to boost health care will be fiscally expensive and crowd out other growth
- Only countries that have room (i.e. fiscal space, growth, political stability) to stimulate growth and upgrade their healthcare systems will be able to navigate this environment reasonably well. Korea seems stable in this regard.

### In EEMEA slightly better health system offsets older population



Poland, Russia, Turkey have fiscal space, South Africa doesn't



Note: Bubble size = x/y, Source: OECD, UN, Haver, BofA Global Research


Source: Haver, BofA Global Research

# **ESG** helps to avoid credit pitfalls



- Sovereigns with better ESG rank are also less likely to experience credit rating downgrades over the next five years, and vice versa. Better institutions provide better safeguards against rapid deterioration in fundamentals which typically results from social conflict, fiscal spending sprees, etc
- Korea, although not included in chart, should be relatively sound given decent rankings in sources such as "Global Sustainable Competitiveness Index" where it tanked 27<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries

### Worst ESG = highest risk of downgrades over next five years, and vice versa



Will the economy follow the markets?



# Systematic risk over?




• Notably we saw the 1st week of investment grade bond (IG) inflows of \$0.8bn post-5 weeks of sizable outflows. Further given that the prime MMF outflows also seem to be ending, it seems that the epicenter of systemic risk has been calmed by Fed.

### Investors return to IG funds after record redemptions

# 20 | Weekly IG corp bond flows (\$bn) | 10 | -10 | -20 | -30 | -40 | -50 | -60 | Jan'20 | Feb'20 | Mar'20 | Apr'20

### Record Prime MMF outflows also ending



Source: BofA Global Investment Strategy, EPFR Global

Source: BofA Global Investment Strategy, iMoneynet




# Mountain of cash and investors turning into forced buyers

- AUM of US money market funds stands at \$4.5tn (>\$3.5tn equity market cap of Eurozone, close to \$4.9tn mkt cap of EM stocks).
- Given the sizable liquidity injection with monetary + fiscal stimulus = 15% of global GDP, rally now broadening into junk away from quality as bond investors. HY bond & equity investors are now "forced buyers" to hedge against Q3 GDP bounce.

### **US Money Market Fund assets soar to \$4.5tn**

#### Week ended Apri 4.4 8th (\$4.5tn) Money Market Funds Assets 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.2 Apr-19 Aug-19 Oct-19 Jun-19 Dec-19 Feb-20 Apr-20

### Liquidity injection turning investors into "forced buyers"



Source: BofA Global Investment Strategy, Bloomberg, FRED

Source: BofA Global Investment Strategy, Bloomberg

# Possibility of a long recession..? – see jobless claims and mortgage applications




- To judge the possibility of a longer recession, we need to watch weekly data on US
  jobless claims. We would need a big drop from sizable current levels of 6 million to <1
  million in order to calm recession concerns.</li>
- We would also need to see US mortgage applications (purchase) bounce, which is a good lead indicator of consumers, to see if we can avoid a long recession

### The bad news...initial claims hit staggering 6.6mn...

### 

### ...and mortgage applications are plunging



Source: BofA Global Investment Strategy, Bloomberg, FRED

Source: BofA Global Investment Strategy, Bloomberg, FRED

# Possibility of a long recession..? – see bank lending and Fed balance sheet




US bank lending has been rising to fresh highs (up from \$14.0tn to \$14.7tn). This needs
to continue along with the surge in Fed balance sheets, to signal that Fed liquidity is
finding real economy.

### The goods news...US bank lending rising to fresh highs...

#### 14.8 ר Week ended April 1st (\$14.7tn) 14.6 Bank Loans (\$tn) 14.4 14.2 14.0 13.8+ 13.6-13.4 Oct-19 Feb-20 Apr-20 Jun-19 Aug-19 Dec-19 Apr-19

### ...alongside the engorged Fed balance sheet




# Need to see more bank lending along with Fed balance sheet expansion



 Combination of bank lending and Fed balance sheet expansion will imply that Fed policies are having real impact, which is something we didn't see in the Global Financial Crisis.

### Combo of rising bank lending & Fed balance sheet key to economic recovery




# When will economies reopen?



- Industrial and construction capacity have largely been restored with 99% of large firms and 84% of SMEs as of mid April
- Supply side in China mostly back to capacity 85% of housing and infrastructure project resumed work by 1 April

Global equities moving with the number of countries reporting a new high in daily COVID-19 cases, suggesting continued recovery as the pandemic fades out

We expect a sharper global recession in 2020, followed by a strong recovery the next year, including a staggering 30% annualized QoQ contraction in US GDP in 2Q 2020



Source: BofA Global Research, John Hopkins University, Bloomberg. Note: Only countries with cumulative cases of 50 or above till date are considered.



Source: BofA Global Research


### When will economies reopen?



- The majority of rest of Asia to be next in line for economic recovery followed by EU and US
- Germany has already started to reopen

Central bank balance sheet expansion drives asset prices...estimated USD7tn central bank balance sheet expansion coming in 2020

BofA April Fund Manager Survey shows extreme investor pessimism as average cash balance jumped from 5.1% last month to 5.9% now, the highest level since the 9/11 terrorist attacks



8-7-6-5-4-99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 — Average Cash Balance (%)

Source: BofA Global Research, Bloomberg

Source: BofA Global Fund Manager Survey, Bloomberg

# How sharp will the recovery in activity be?



# China's Road to Normalcy: Energy demand has recently exceeded 2019 levels




- According to survey of BofA analysts, most voted in favor of U shaped recovery from COVID-19. Restoration of demand holds the key to sustained economic recovery
- Market demand in China may fully recover to its 2019 level by the end of the month
- Notably, consumption of coal at major power plants exceeded the 2019 level
- China's retail consumption is below the prepandemic level, thanks to pent-up demand and government support measures. Green shoots are visible in select areas like cosmetics, luxury goods
- Chinese inter city traffic volume have also picked up major city traffic volumes have normalized

# How sharp will the recovery in activity be?



# Aggregated daily spending on BAC credit and debit cards



- Although down from last year's levels, there is a notable sequential improvement on aggregated daily spending on BAC credit and debit cards across categories, barring airlines, lodging and entertainment
- In the US, where the pandemic is in the most severe stages, there are signs of stabilization in retail consumption, backed by BAC credit and debit card usage, ending Apr 16 (28% YoY up)

Source: BAC internal data. Note: Travel includes airlines, lodging and cruises. Spillover sectors include restaurants, clothing, department stores, and furniture. Necessities include groceries, general merchandise, and health & personal stores and online electronics.

Global emerging markets snapshot - amidst COVID-19




# Black Swan events: Short-term crisis, Long-term opportunity



 Looking at the previous black swan events, we can see that they have been solid long term investing opportunities

**S&P 500 Performance (October 1,1973 to April 24,2020)** 







# Sluggish macros for most GEMs amid low interest rate environment

- GDP forecasts have been cut heavily by COVID-19 with many countries even expecting negative growth. Notably, Korea and China only expect 0.7% / 1.5% growth each.
- Recent trend of interest rate cuts have created a low interest rate environment as many countries have negative rates if adjusted for inflation.

#### Real GDP growth (%, 2020F)

Real policy interest rate\* (%, CPI adjusted, latest)





Source: BofA Global Research

‡‡Fiscal Year (FY21 for India). Source: BofA Global Research, IMF

Source: BofA Global Research

\*Current policy rate or ST rate adjusted for trailing CPI inflation; ‡‡Fiscal Year (FY21 for India). Source: BofA Global Research





# Low inflation and current account provides some support

- Most big GEMs expect low inflation which will allow central banks to cut rates.
- Further, some big GEMS seem reasonably resilient in terms of current accounts, especially for Taiwan, Korea and Thailand.

### CPI inflation (%, 2020F)

### **Current account balance (% GDP, 2020F)**





Source: Euro monitor Source: Gongkong, CCID




# Korea and Russia with sound fiscal balance and public debt levels

- Taiwan and Korea have sound fiscal balance with negative balance of <1x GDP, while countries in Africa and S. America seem to have more troubling levels of fiscal balance.
- High public debt still remain an issue but Korea seems to have relatively sound levels of 40% of GDP. Notably, Russia had very low levels at only 15% of GDP.

### Fiscal balance (% GDP, 2020F)

#### -0.6<sub>0.7</sub>-0.7<sub>-1.4</sub>-1.7<sub>-2.2</sub>-2.6<sub>-3.0</sub>-3.5 -2 -4 -6 -7.0-7.4-7.5-7.8 -8 Best-5 -10 **GEM - 10** -12 Worst-5 -14 -14.4 -16 Mexico Korea Russia Poland China ndia‡‡ Turkey Egypt## ≣cuador ndonesia Brazil Costa Rica South Africa Ghana Saudi Arabia

### Public debt (% GDP, 2020F)



‡‡Fiscal Year (FY21 for India). Source: BofA Global Research

‡‡Fiscal Year . Source: BofA Global Research

# Net external position and FX reserve – Russia is solid, while Korea and China are in middle-ranges




- Overall net external position was low, with most major GEMs having negative positions. Korea ranks in the middle range at -6% of GDP.
- Among big GEMs, Russia has the most solid FX reserves while Korea and China ranks somewhere in the middle.

### **Net external position\* (% GDP, latest)**

#### 53 60 Best-5 **GEM - 10** Worst-5 50 40 30 23 22 18 20 3 0 10 -1 -3 -4 -6 -10<sub>-10</sub>-11-11 -14<sub>-16</sub>-18 -10 -20 -30 -40 China^^ Mexico^ Poland^ Brazil^ Slovakia\*\*\*^ lordan^^ Saudi Arabia^^ India^ Korea^ Szech Republic<sup>A</sup> Russia^ Kuwait\*\*\*^ Venezuela^ South Africa' Indonesia' Latvia\*\*\*/

\*Countries' net external position vs BIS reporting banks. Rankings exclude some countries as external positions biased upwards for offshore centers (Bahrain, Seychelles) or due to significant nonresident deposits (Lebanon). ^^ - countries with fixed/non-floating exchange rate regime; ^ - countries with floating exchange rate regime; \*\*\*Data not comparable for external debt/positions and FX reserves: Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia as Eurozone members. Source: BofA Global Research, BIS

#### FX reserves/ST external debt\*



\*Total reserves ex gold over external debt with original maturity up to 1 year. Rankings exclude some countries as external debt biased upwards for offshore centers (Bahrain, Seychelles) or due to significant nonresident deposits (Lebanon); or FX reserves not fully reported due to sovereign wealth funds (Kuwait, Qatar and UAE); ^^ - countries with fixed/non-floating exchange rate regime; ^ - countries with floating exchange rate regime; \*\*\*Data not comparable for external debt/positions and FX reserves: Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia as Eurozone members. Source: BofA Global Research




# Solid gross external debt levels for most major GEMS

 Most major GEMs show sound levels of Gross external debt with China, India and Korea ranking the highest among large economies. China and India also show solid levels in terms of private sector external debt.

#### **Gross external debt (% GDP, latest)**

#### 227 Best-5 **GEM - 10** Worst-5 200 150 113 112 100 36 35 <sub>29 28</sub> 50 Georgia Russia Latvia Poland Turkey Mexico Korea China Nigeria Brazil India Algeria Venezuela Slovakia South Africa Indonesia Azerbaijan


### **Gross external debt: private sector (% GDP, latest)**



### Rather low current account balance + net FDI



# Current account balance + net FDI (4q sum, % GDP, latest)



- In terms of current account balance and net foreign direct investment (FDI), major GEMs seem to have rather low levels excluding Taiwan at 10.4x GDP.
- Korea and China are in the middle level at 2.1x and 1.7x GDP each. Korea's heavy FDI outflows lead it to slide from having the 2<sup>nd</sup> highest current account balance (vs GDP) to 9<sup>th</sup> on incorporation of net FDI.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>Data not comparable as external debt biased upwards for offshore centers (Bahrain, Seychelles) or due to significant nonresident deposits (Lebanon); FX reserves not fully reported due to sovereign wealth funds (Kuwait, Qatar and UAE); Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia as Eurozone members; ^^ - countries with fixed/non-floating exchange rate regime; ^- countries with floating exchange rate regime; Source: BofA Global Research based on IMF and national sources




# **Private sector credit – concerning for China and Korea**

- Private sector credit are at very high levels for Taiwan and China which should increase risks on prolonging of the macro slowdown from COVID-19.
- Korea also had high levels at of private sector credit at 93% of GDP while also showing high levels of growth (as did China) at 10%+ YoY growth

### **Private sector credit (% GDP, latest)**

#### 240 **GEM - 10** Lowest-5 Highest-5 191 200 160 120 80 55 52 52 43 40 Malaysia Indonesia Zambia Russia Turkey Gabon Angola South Africa India Poland Mexico

### Private credit growth (% yoy, 3mma, latest)



Source: BofA Global Research

Source: BofA Global Research







- Most major GEMs display rather sound banking sector stability shown by decent levels
  of bank capital in comparison to assets and risk-weighted assets
- Korea seems to have rather low levels of bank capital in comparison to other GEMs with bank capital only at 8% of assets and 15% of risk-weighted assets

### Bank capital to assets, %

Bank capital to risk-weighted assets (%, latest)





Korea,
Desperate for a silver lining



### Investments – Why need more capex?



# Declining capacity utilization rate of Korean manufacturers




- Macro recovery has been mainly dragged by weak domestic investments
- Korean manufacturers' capacity utilization rate has been steadily declining
- Also, construction and facilities investments faltered along with conservative corporate capex plans

# Investments – below historical average



# **Gross Fixed-capital Formation as Percentage of GDP**




- Gross fixed-capital formation is a measure that shows how much of the new value added in the economy is invested rather than consumed.
- In 2019, gross fixed-capital formation stood at 29.8% of nominal GDP, slightly below the historical average of 31% of GDP.

### Productivity matters – but it is on the decline



# Annual production per worker in Korean manufacturers




- Auto industry Korea's representative manufacturing sector – is a good example of productivity decline.
- HMC's hour per-vehicle production is the longest in Korea factories vs. overseas, implying low productivity per unit cost.
- Annual production value per worker in Korea continues to remain lower than overseas auto peers.
- Also, production per worker in Korean manufacturers has been steadily declining since 2011.
- The declining competitiveness of domestic production is leading to weaker investment sentiment.

# **Labor markets – Job contraction on COVID-19 impacts**



# Net job gains (YoY) plummet mainly in wholesale, retail, hotel/restaurants




- Jobs decrease for most industries in March on COVID-19 impacts with the most substantial impact on wholesale, retail and hotel/restaurants.
- Even before the pandemic, job creation in Korea had been rather weak on the following factors:
  - Weak growth outlook in traditional manufacturers and service industries
  - Lack of new growth engine an innovation
  - Increasing overseas relocation due to the rigidity of Korea's labor market
  - Greater focus on improving labor productivity than increasing new hires, given the deteriorating cost-efficiency from an ageing workforce and additional pro-labor laws

# **Domestic consumption – Actually weaker than the statistics**



# Private consumption and household disposable income growth




- Household disposable income growth has been at lower levels of 3-4.5% in recent years, down from 5-7.5% levels in early-tomid 2000s
- Along with a slowdown in disposable income growth private consumption growth has also slowed down to flattish growth
- If considering the rising cost of living for housing (the interest and principal payments for mortgages, jeonse loans, monthly rent payments), the room for additional consumption would be limited

# Domestic consumption – ~¼<sup>th</sup> of growth is a function of inbound foreign visitors



### **Quarterly inbound visitation to Korea**




- Inbound tourism growth mainly led by Chinese visitation – has become a large swing factor to Korea's domestic consumption growth (= residents' & foreigners' consumption in Korea). We now see that is has fell considerably in 1Q20 due to COVID-19.
- The portion of foreigners' domestic consumption is still minimal, but it has a large impact due to its high volatility.
- For example, back in 2017, residents' consumption grew 2.4% YoY, but foreigners' consumption fell 27.9% YoY, due to a significant drop in Chinese tourists. Hence, total domestic consumption growth fell to 1.7% YoY, as the decline in foreigners' consumption dragged down the total growth by 0.6ppt.

### Food driven inflation risks



- US Beef prices have hit historical highs in a matter of weeks due to supply chain disruption from COVID-19 impacts, with facilities such as slaughterhouses temporarily closed down
- Beef prices could go up even further on as restaurants open back up

# USDA boxed beef cutout 600-900lb choice cut prices




# **Exports – Deteriorating terms of trade**



- Export growth has been falling rapidly with the most recent April exports down 24% YoY.
- However, terms of trade indices have continued to stay at rather weak levels.
- Korea's export volume and price should be face even further challenges going forward on such a global slowdown in demand from the pandemic


### **Terms of trade indices**



# KRW depreciation – Key trigger of capital outflows



### Foreign holding of Korean bonds




- During 2010-12, the KRW appreciated as the USD weakened on Fed's QE. Net foreign inflow into Korean bonds amounted to around \$60bn during the period
- From 2015, the KRW depreciated as China depreciated its currency, leading to net foreign outflows
- Hence, the major factor leading to higher risks of capital outflows seem to be expectations for KRW depreciation, aside from interest rate reversals between Korea-US


# Dent in corporate profitability – Higher COGS, lower OPM



### Cost of goods as percentage of sales

# **Quarterly aggregate OP margins**





# **Analyst Certification**



I, Bryan Song, hereby certify that the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my personal views about the subject securities and issuers. I also certify that no part of my compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly, related to the specific recommendations or view expressed in this research report.

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Investment rating	Total return expectation (within 12-month period of date of initial rating)	Ratings dispersion guidelines for coverage cluster*
Buy	≥ 10%	≤ 70%
Neutral	≥ 0%	≤ 30%
Underperform	N/A	≥ 20%

<sup>\*</sup> Ratings dispersions may vary from time to time where BofA Global Research believes it better reflects the investment prospects of stocks in a Coverage Cluster.

**INCOME RATINGS,** indicators of potential cash dividends, are: 7 - same/higher (dividend considered to be secure), 8 - same/lower (dividend not considered to be secure) and 9 - pays no cash dividends. Coverage Cluster is comprised of stocks covered by a single analyst or two or more analysts sharing a common industry, sector, region or other classification(s). A stock's coverage cluster is included in the most recent BofA Global Research report referencing the stock.

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